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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant trends in modern leasing has
been the application of contract law principles to an area of law
heretofore governed by the law of property conveyance.' Con-
tract principles are now being applied in disputes over residen-
tial leases.2 Many residential leases today are based on the
assumption that the tenant has contracted for a certain quality
of housing.3 If that quality is less than the tenant has a right to
expect, courts and legislatures have used contract law to award
the tenant damages or other relief.' Contract remedies have sim-
1. In common-law countries, such as England and the United States, courts tradi-
tionally have held that a lease of land is a conveyance that "vests an estate in the ten-
ant" for a certain period of time. H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 87, at 134
(3d ed. 1939). The lease "conveys" a possessory estate to the lessee, hence the term "con-
veyancing" as applied to property lease law. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11, at 202
(A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
The rule of caveat emptor applies in conveyancing law. "[A] tenant has no implied
warranties that the premises are fit for his use . . . . [A] party cannot rescind for the
other's breach, however material, for the conveyancing rule says that covenants are inde-
pendent." Stoebuck, The Law Between Landlord and Tenant in Washington: Part 1, 49
WASH. L. REv. 291, 307 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Stoebuck, Part 1]. See infra text
accompanying notes 13-17. See also Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 622-29, 517
P.2d 1168, 1171-76, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 707-12 (1974), for a good discussion of conveyanc-
ing laws as they apply to residential leases.
2. E.g., Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 457, 378 A.2d 767, 772 (1977) (landlord must
exercise reasonable diligence to minimize damages after tenant abandons apartment).
3. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.) (Washing-
ton, D.C., housing regulations imposed an implied warranty of habitability in housing
leases), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 627,
517 P.2d 1168, 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 711 (1974) ("public policy compels landlords to
bear the primary responsibility for maintaining safe, clean and habitable housing");
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970) (in residential leases, land-
lord should "be held to an implied covenant against latent defects, which is another
manner of saying, habitability and livability fitness").
4. See infra notes 18-30 and accompanying text.
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ilarly protected landlords against nonpaying tenants.5 In many
cases, courts have used the doctrine of dependent covenants to
find contractual remedies in residential leases.'
Commercial leases, however, have not been affected to the
same degree by the growing dependent covenant trend. Most
courts apply strict conveyancing rules to commercial leases.7 An
oft-cited reason for not applying contract rules is that business
persons bargain "at arm's length" and therefore have the knowl-
edge and leverage to ensure that each party profits from the
lease arrangement.8 Thus, bargaining between commercial par-
ties should result in a classic conveyancing situation: the obliga-
tions of the landlord and tenant should be mutually exclusive,
and breach of one party's covenants should not excuse a breach
of the other person's promises.9
5. E.g., Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 59.18 (1983). For
instance, WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.310 (1983) gives the landlord the right to collect
future rents after the tenant abandons the premises (contract remedy) and the right to
retake possession (conveyance remedy).
6. E.g., Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 28, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (1973) (tenant's
duties are dependent on landlord's performance of implied covenant to keep the prem-
ises habitable). "Dependent covenants are those which depend on the prior performance
of some act or condition, and until the act or condition is performed, the covenantor is
not liable to an action on his covenant." 3 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1115, at 377 (J.S. Grimes replacement 1980).
7. See, e.g., Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 145, 146 P. 423, 424 (1915) (covenant
to repair and covenant to pay rent are independent absent a specific agreement to the
contrary), overruled, Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704 (1974); Rock County Say. & Trust Co. v. Yost's, Inc., 36 Wis. 2d 360, 369, 153
N.W.2d 594, 598 (1967) (court refused to reverse rule that commercial lease covenants
are independent).
See also C & J Delivery, Inc. v. Vinyard & Lee & Partners, 647 S.W.2d 564, 568
(Mo. App. 1983). In C & J Delivery, the Missouri court held that the tenants could not
terminate the lease when the landlord breached the covenant of first approval because
promises are independent in commercial leases unless expressly made dependent. In
dicta, however, the court recognized that the "modern realities of a commercial lease and
the true intention of the contracting parties may mitigate in favor of. . .a wholly bilat-
eral agreement." Id. at 568 n.2.
8. Arm's length bargaining is one important rationale that courts have used to limit
the expansion of the doctrine of mutually dependent covenants into the commercial lease
area. Kruvant v. Sunrise Market, Inc., 58 N.J. 452, 456, 279 A.2d 104, 106 (1970)
(because a commercial lease is "negotiated at arm's length," the covenants are not
dependent), modified, 59 N.J. 330, 282 A.2d 746 (1971). See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY, supra note 1, § 3.11, at 202-03.
9. E.g., Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3d 552, 561, 166 Cal. Rptr. 620, 625 (1980)
(in a commercial lease, the parties "are more likely to have equal bargaining power, and,
more importantly, a commercial tenant will presumably have sufficient interest in the
demised premises to make needed repairs and the means to make needed repairs");
Kruvant v. Sunrise Market, Inc., 58 N.J. 452, 456, 279 A.2d 104, 106 (1970) (court
refused to allow contract law to govern a commercial lease because it was "negotiated at
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A small but growing number of courts and commentators,
however, understand that commercial tenants often deserve the
protections of a contract theory that stresses dependence of cov-
enants. 10 Some courts have turned to contract law to fashion
relief for commercial landlords as well, especially when tenants
refuse to pay rent or to perform other agreed-upon services.1
Washington courts have joined the modern trend that finds
dependent covenants in commercial leases. Indeed, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court applied contract law to a commercial lease
dispute in Hindquarter Corp. v. Property Development Corp.,"
thus moving to the forefront of the trend. The decision has seri-
arm's length between parties of equal bargaining power"), modified, 59 N.J. 330, 282
A.2d 746 (1971).
10. Courts in the following states have applied dependent covenant rationales used
by residential tenants to commercial lease situations: California, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, and Texas. The California courts of appeal are divided and that supreme court
has not ruled on an appropriate commercial lease dispute. See Custom Parking, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 138 Cal. App. 3d 90, 187 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1982) (protection against retali-
atory eviction extended to commercial tenant); Four Seas Invest. Corp. v. International
Hotel Tenants Ass'n, 81 Cal. App. 3d 604, 146 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1978) (in dicta the court
said that some commercial tenants deserved the same protection against retaliatory evic-
tion as residential tenants); Groh v. Kover's Bull Pen, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 2d 611, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 637 (1963) (covenant to repair went to the consideration for the lease and thus the
tenant could refuse to pay rent). But see Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3d 552, 166
Cal. Rptr. 620 (1980) (covenant to repair, though express, was not dependent on duty to
pay rent in a commercial setting); Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass.
124, 163 N.E.2d 4 (1959) (constructive eviction when the landlord failed to provide elec-
tricity and elevator service); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268
(1969) (commercial tenant was constructively evicted by periodic flooding within the
control of the landlord); Demirci v. Burns, 124 N.J. Super. 274, 306 A.2d 468 (1973)
(commercial tenants entitled to same defenses as residential tenants when landlord
neglected to maintain premises); Ingram v. Fred, 210 S.W. 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918)
(tenant allowed to break lease when roof leaked severely because building was unlivable).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1 reporter's note 2, at 176 (1977) ("The
Reporter is of the opinion that the rules of implied warranty of habitability should be
extended to nonresidential property. The small commercial tenant particularly needs its
protection.").
See infra note 55 and accompanying text for a list of cases in which an option to
renew the lease has been made impliedly dependent upon compliance with the tenant's
covenants. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of material
inducement as a rationale for using contract rules to determine commercial lease
disputes.
11. E.g., Dave Herstein Co. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 157 N.Y.S.2d 130, 132 (Sup.
Ct., Spec. Term 1956) (payment of rent is a condition precedent to enforcement of cove-
nant of quiet enjoyment), afl'd, 4 N.Y.2d 117, 149 N.E.2d 328, 172 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1958);
Silken v. Farrell, 281 A.D. 718, 718, 118 N.Y.S.2d 808, 808 (1952) (breach of quiet enjoy-
ment suit not allowed because tenant was in tax arrears), afl'd, 306 N.Y. 585, 115 N.E.2d
686 (1953).
12. 95 Wash. 2d 809, 631 P.2d 923 (1981) (en banc). See infra notes 41-52 and
accompanying text.
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ous implications for those who draft and enforce nonresidential
leases in Washington. Following Hindquarter, Washington
courts will be increasingly receptive to claims that nonresiden-
tial lease provisions are mutually dependent, even to the extent
that courts will find dependent covenants implied in commercial
lease agreements.
This Note demonstrates that the Washington Supreme
Court correctly applied contract principles to the Hindquarter
lease dispute. The Note first reviews the historical development
of dependent covenants in both residential and commercial con-
texts. After setting out this important background information,
the Note examines Hindquarter and the three factors that influ-
enced the Washington Supreme Court in following the depen-
dent covenants trend: (1) material inducements to execute the
lease; (2) the intent of the parties; and (3) equity and policy con-
siderations. The Note concludes that, even though the landlord
prevailed in Hindquarter, commercial tenants stand to gain
most from the supreme court's decision.
II. HISTORICAL APPLICATION OF DEPENDENT COVENANT
ARGUMENTS
Under English common law, lease agreements involved an
exchange of independent promises."3 The breach of one party's
promises did not excuse the other party's nonperformance
unless the lease contained express conditions allowing nonper-
formance. 4 Whether express or implied, the two covenants inva-
riably present in any lease were the tenant's duty to pay some
kind of rent and the landlord's promise not to interfere with the
tenant's quiet enjoyment of the leased property.' 5 A feudal ten-
ant could not be ejected for nonpayment of rent unless the lease
13. Stoebuck, Part I, supra note 1, at 307 ("Traditionally English and American
courts have said conveyancing rules control . .. land] a tenant has no implied warran-
ties that the premises are fit for his use.").
14. Siegel, Is the Modern Lease a Contract or a Conveyance? A Historical Inquiry,
52 J. URB. L. 649, 663 (1975) ("Absent facts or written expressions indicating a contrary
intention, lease covenants are generally construed as independent obligations .... ).
See generally Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 622-29, 517 P.2d 1168, 1171-76,
111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 707-12 (1974) (extensive discussion of the history of lease law).
15. Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence,
or Strict Liability?, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 19, 32. "There were two implied covenants in any
lease: the landlord's covenant to keep the tenant in peaceful possession . . . and the
tenant's covenant to pay the rent. In the absence of a provision making them condi-
tional, these covenants were deemed to be independent of each other." Id.
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specifically so provided. I" Not until the early 1800s did English
statutes permit ejectment for failure to pay rent.
1 7
American courts followed the English common law until the
twentieth century, when they began to find express or implied
dependent covenants in residential leases.1 8  The impetus
stemmed in part from housing codes brought about by changes
in public policy. 9 Residential tenants successfully argued that a
warranty of habitability could be inferred from the standards set
forth in local housing codes. ° In the typical case, the landlord
tried to evict the tenant for nonpayment of rent, and the tenant
countered that the apartment's condition violated the local
housing code.2"
Even in the absence of an express housing code, many
courts have recently held that a residential tenant may be
relieved of the promise to pay rent if the landlord has breached
an implied warranty of habitability.2 2 The successful tenant
16. McGovern, Dependent Promises in the History of Leases and Other Contracts,
52 TUL. L. REV. 659, 665 (1978).
17. Id. The remedy is limited to situations in which the tenant abandoned the prop-
erty. In England today a landlord may not evict a nonpaying tenant who is still in pos-
session unless the lease specifically gives the landlord that remedy. Id.
18. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir.) ("today's
urban tenants . . . are interested, not in the land, but solely in 'a house suitable for
occupation' "), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616,
640, 517 P.2d 1168, 1184, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 720 (1974) ("outworn" common-law doc-
trines must give way to new interpretations reflecting modern society's values and eth-
ics); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 28, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (1973) ("There can be little
justification for following a rule that was developed for an agrarian society and has failed
to keep pace with modern day realities."); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 111
N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1961) ("To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability
in leases would . . . be inconsistent with the current legislative policy .... "). One com-
mentator has noted that "[ciourts adopting the implied warranty of habitability have
emphasized that the factual assumptions underlying the original common law of land-
lord-tenant relations have long ceased to exist." Love, supra note 15, at 98.
19. Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV.
443, 465 (1972).
20. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.) (D.C. housing
code implied that landlord would keep premises fit for occupation), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 31, 515 P.2d 160, 166 (1973) (trial
court erroneously excluded evidence showing apartment building violated Seattle hous-
ing codes; though not conclusive, such evidence would have helped build a case for
uninhabitability). Courts in New York and Hawaii have similarly ruled that a housing
code may be used to help demonstrate dependent covenants. See Lund v. MacArthur, 51
Hawaii 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318
N.Y.S.2d 11 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971).
21. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 31, 515 P.2d 160, 166 (1973).
22. E.g., Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970) (in which the
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must prove that the defects were so substantial that they
amounted to a breach of the landlord's duty to provide habita-
ble premises. Some examples of substantial defects include lack
of heat, faulty plumbing, vermin infestation, or other major
health and safety defects.23
Until 1973 Washington courts generally held that there was
no implied warranty of fitness in either residential or commer-
cial leased property.24 In that year, both the legislature and the
supreme court spoke in favor of residential tenants' rights to
habitable premises. The Residential Landlord-Tenant Act 5
modified traditional conveyancing law to give tenants more pro-
tection. Within a few months of the Act, the supreme court held
in Foisy v. Wyman26 that there was also a state common-law
warranty of habitability for residential tenants.2 The tenant in
court held that it is fair to make the landlord responsible for renting and maintaining
habitable premises); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 482, 268 A.2d
556, 559 (1970) ("In a modern society one cannot be expected to live in a multi-storied
apartment building without heat, hot water, garbage disposal, or elevator service. Failure
to supply such things is a breach of the implied covenant of habitability."); Foisy v.
Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 28, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (1973) ("there is an implied warranty of
habitability and breach of this warranty constitutes a defense in an unlawful detainer
action").
23. E.g., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 621, 517 P.2d 1168, 1170, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 706 (1974) (major defects included faulty wiring, defective appliances, insuffi-
cient heat, and vermin infestation); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 134, 265 A.2d 526,
534-35 (1970) (apartment had faulty plumbing); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 593,
111 N.W.2d 409, 411 (1961) (students rented apartment that had structural and health
defects).
24. Stoebuck, Part I, supra note 1, at 342. See, e.g., Penney v. Pederson, 146 Wash.
31, 33, 261 P. 636, 637 (1927) (no implied warranty of safety or fitness of premises);
McGinnis v. Keylon, 135 Wash. 588, 591, 238 P. 631, 632 (1925) ("in the absence of an
express contract to the contrary, a tenant takes the demised premises in the condition in
which he finds them, and. . . there is no implied warranty"). But cf. Washington Choco-
late Co. v. Kent, 28 Wash. 2d 448, 452, 183 P.2d 514, 516 (1947). In Washington Choco-
late Co., chocolate stored in a landlord's warehouse that was contaminated by rats was
condemned and seized by health officials. The tenant successfully claimed constructive
eviction for the seizure and recovered damages. The court held that "[iun all tenancies
there is an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment." Id.
25. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 59.18 (1983). Many provisions of the Act gave tenants
rights they previously did not have. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.060 (1983) (the
right to habitable premises); WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.290 (1983) (the right to claim
damages or to terminate if the landlord removes the tenant from possession); WASH. REV.
CODE § 59.18.300 (1983) (the right to assert remedies without first vacating if the land-
lord cuts off utilities).
26. 83 Wash. 2d 22, 28, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (1973).
27. "The value of the lease . . . is that it gives the tenant a place to live, and he
expects not just space but a dwelling that protects him from the elements . . . without
subjecting him to health hazards." Id. at 27, 515 P.2d at 164.
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Foisy knowingly rented run-down premises at a greatly reduced
monthly rental. When the landlord later brought an unlawful
detainer action for nonpayment of rent, the tenant defended by
claiming that the landlord violated an implied warranty of hab-
itability by renting dilapidated premises.28 The court first traced
the growing implied warranty trend in other jurisdictions 9 and
then concluded that in Washington, too, every dwelling lease
contained such a dependent covenant by implication.3
By comparison, commercial tenants have not been as suc-
cessful as their residential counterparts in persuading courts to
accept dependent covenant theories. 31 This has been true even
when commercial tenants have offered as precedent analogous
residential cases decided in the same jurisdiction.32 In several
instances, the state courts that generously implied the existence
of dependent covenants in residential leases have refused to
imply dependent covenants in commercial leases under similar
facts.33
There have been some instances, however, in which the
courts have found dependent covenants in commercial leases. 4
28. Id. at 24, 515 P.2d at 162.
29. Id. at 25-28, 515 P.2d at 163-65. "Throughout the United States, the old rule of
caveat emptor in the leasing of premises has been undergoing judicial scrutiny." Id. at
25, 515 P.2d at 163.
30. Id. at 28, 515 P.2d at 164 ("We therefore hold that in all contracts for the rent-
ing of premises . . . there is an implied warranty of habitability .... ").
31. See, e.g., Kruvant v. Sunrise Market, Inc., 58 N.J. 452, 456, 279 A.2d 104, 106
(1970) (because equal commercial parties bargained at arm's length, the tenant would
not be treated as a residential tenant), modified, 59 N.J. 330, 282 A.2d 746 (1971); Rock
County Sav. & Trust Co. v. Yost's, Inc., 36 Wis. 2d 360, 369, 153 N.W.2d 594, 598 (1967)
(tenant had no right to terminate lease when landlord withheld consent to sublet).
32. E.g., Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3d 552, 560, 166 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624 (1980)
(court declined to follow ruling on residential warranty of habitability); Yuan Kane Ing
v. Levy, 26 Ill. App. 3d 889, 891, 326 N.E.2d 51, 54 (1975) (court refused to extend previ-
ous case law protecting residential tenants).
33. E.g., Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3d 552, 558-60, 166 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624-25
(1980) (previous California cases restricted to residential tenants, so the court declined
to extend the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability to a commercial dispute). See
also Olson v. Scholes, 17 Wash. App. 383, 393, 563 P.2d 1275, 1281 (1977) (commercial
tenant not allowed to claim warranty of habitability for dog kennel); Cherberg v. Peoples
Nat'l Bank, 15 Wash. App. 336, 345, 549 P.2d 46, 52 (1976) (commercial landlord's fail-
ure to shore up a weak outer wall was held not to breach either express or implied lease
covenants; however, an independent duty to repair arose when the city government
required the landlord to fix the wall in the interest of public safety and welfare), rev'd on
other grounds, 88 Wash. 2d 595, 564 P.2d 1137 (1977).
34. E.g., Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 422, 132
P.2d 457, 463 (1942) (en banc); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 145, 265 A.2d 526, 534
(1970); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 455, 251 A.2d 268, 276 (1969); Demirci
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Some commercial tenants have successfully argued that con-
structive eviction,35 noncompetition clauses,3 6 or inequality of
bargaining position37 are reasons why their duties to landlords
should be dependent on fulfillment of the landlord's responsibil-
ities. In most cases, the success of the commercial tenant has
hinged upon the degree to which the commercial tenant resem-
bles a residential tenant: the more similar the circumstances, the
more willing courts have been to find dependent covenants in
commercial leases.38 Although tenants have usually had the most
v. Burns, 124 N.J. Super. 274, 275, 306 A.2d 468, 469 (1973).
35. Constructive eviction occurs when the tenant cannot remain on the premises
because of the property's condition, rather than when the landlord takes back for his
own use part or all of the leased property. E.g., Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J.
444, 449-502, 251 A.2d 268, 270-71 (1969) (periodic flooding of jewelry wholesaler's base-
ment office interfered with training programs and wholesale business). The Reste court
listed other examples of constructive eviction: lack of heat, backed-up sewer line, or
neighbors who used the premises for lewd purposes. Id. at 453, 251 A.2d at 275. See also
Groh v. Kover's Bull Pen, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 2d 611, 614, 34 Cal. Rptr. 637, 639 (1963)
(tenant constructively evicted when landlord neglected to repair restaurant roof);
Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 127, 163 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1959)
(constructive eviction occurred when landlord failed to provide electricity and elevator
service as provided in the lease); Washington Chocolate Co. v. Kent, 28 Wash. 2d 448,
452, 183 P.2d 514, 516 (1947) (tenant awarded damages for constructive eviction because
rented warehouse was rat-infested).
36. Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 417-18, 132 P.2d
457, 461 (1942) (en banc) (when landlord allowed large medical firm on top floor to sell
medicine to its patients, contrary to noncompetition clause in tenant's lease, tenant was
allowed to breach the lease because continuance of the lease was dependent on the non-
competition clause); University Club v. Deakin, 265 Ill. 257, 260, 106 N.E. 790, 792
(1914) (jewelry store's noncompetition clause dependent on tenant's duty to pay rent);
Teodori v. Werner, 490 Pa. 58, 60, 415 A.2d 31, 34 (1980) (jewelry store tenant in shop-
ping center had agreement with landlord that the latter would not lease to any other
jewelry stores; when another jewelry store moved in, the tenant was allowed to breach
the lease because the duty to pay rent was dependent on the noncompetition covenant).
See also infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
37. E.g., Kruvant v. Sunrise Market, Inc., 58 N.J. 452, 456, 279 A.2d 104, 106 (1970)
(in dicta, the court agreed that some commercial tenants do not bargain at arm's length
and thus may be able to use the defenses of residential tenants), modified, 59 N.J. 330,
282 A.2d 746 (1971); Demirci v. Burns, 124 N.J. Super. 274, 276, 306 A.2d 468, 469 (1973)
(commercial tenants were not bargaining as equals). But see Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal.
App. 3d 552, 561, 166 Cal. Rptr. 620, 625 (1980) (court refused to extend residential
tenant defenses to commercial tenant because in a commercial lease "the parties are
more likely to have equal bargaining power").
38. See, e.g., Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 127, 163
N.E.2d 4, 6 (1959) (tenant in large commercial office building had no control over elec-
tricity or elevator service); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 452, 251 A.2d 268,
272 (1970) (small business had no control over structural problems that caused periodic
flooding of basement office and showroom); Demirci v. Burns, 124 N.J. Super. 274, 276,
306 A.2d 468, 469 (1973) (small tenants in commercial office building had as little control
over the building's temperature as would an apartment dweller).
1985] Hindquarter Corp. v. Property Development Corp. 493
to gain from a dependent covenant theory of leasing, landlords,
too, have argued that mutually dependent promises should be
upheld.39 A landlord usually rents the property with the expec-
tation that the tenant will pay the rent on time. When the ten-
ant fails to pay, the landlord often turns to the theory of depen-
dent covenants and claims that the promise of quiet enjoyment
need not be kept. This was the situation that the Washington
State Supreme Court confronted in Hindquarter Corp. v. Prop-
erty Development Corp."'
III. HINDQUARTER CORP. V. PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT CORP.
Hindquarter is a reversal of the usual pattern in which the
tenant seeks relief or raises a defense based on a dependent cov-
enant theory. In Hindquarter, it was the landlord who defended
its refusal to grant an option to renew by claiming that its prom-
ise to renew depended on the tenant's timely payment of rent.4
Tenant Hindquarter Restaurant (Hindquarter) attempted
to exercise a lease renewal option for its premises in a shopping
center. The landlord's assignee, Property Development Corpora-
tion (Property Development), refused to grant the renewal
because the tenant was chronically late with monthly rent
checks, many checks were returned for insufficient funds, and
the tenant was one month in arrears at the time it tried to exer-
cise the five-year option."2 The landlord had filed suit twice to
obtain overdue rent. Hindquarter claimed that its obligation to
pay rent was independent of the option to renew, especially
since the lease did not expressly impose timely rent payment as
a condition of renewal.' 3 Property Development argued that the
tenant's right to renew was "implicitly and inherently . . . con-
39. E.g., Gadsden Bowling Center, Inc. v. Frank, 249 Ala. 435, 439, 31 So. 2d 648,
651 (1947) (tenant's timely rent payment was a condition of original lease, so tenant
could not claim specific performance when landlord refused to renew because rent in
arrears); Brown v. Hoffman, 628 P.2d 617, 621-22 (Colo. 1981) (habitual failure of tenant
to pay rent justified landlord's refusal to renew lease, though he had previously agreed to
renew, because renewal was dependent on timely rent payment).
40. 95 Wash. 2d 809, 631 P.2d 923 (1981).
41. Id. at 813-14, 631 P.2d at 925-26.
42. Hindquarter had leased the premises for ten years and had already exercised
one five-year option to renew when this case arose in 1977. When Property Development
refused to grant the renewal, Hindquarter asked the superior court for a declaratory
judgment of its right to renew under the terms of the lease. Id. at 810, 631 P.2d at 924.
43. Id. at 811, 631 P.2d at 924.
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ditioned upon its timely performance of its lease obligations. ' 44
The King County Superior Court dismissed Hindquarter's
complaint, holding that the renewal right was implicitly depen-
dent upon timely rent payment.45 The court of appeals reversed
because there was no express lease language that made renewal
dependent on timely payment of rent.46 The Washington
Supreme Court reversed the intermediate court in a six-to-three
decision for the landlord.47
The Washington Supreme Court examined the lease lan-
guage and found sufficient intent to tie renewal to rent.' 8 More-
over, the court held that rent was an implied condition for any
lease renewal because rent is the "primary consideration for any
lease."'49 Finally, the majority agreed that it would be "funda-
mentally unfair" 0 to force a landlord to renew its lease with an
unreliable tenant. Conveyancing rules would have required the
landlord to renew, since its duty to renew and Hindquarter's
duty to pay rent would have been independent."1 Under contract
principles, which the court adopted, the covenants were depen-
dent.62 The majority decision focused on three factors that com-
pelled its acceptance of contract principles in a commercial
lease.63
44. Brief for Respondent at 12, Hindquarter Corp. v. Property Development Corp.,
95 Wash. 2d 809, 631 P.2d 923 (1981) (paraphrasing trial court's conclusions of law).
45. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 811, 631 P.2d at 924 (the renewal right "was
implicitly and inherently dependent upon the timely payment of its rent").
46. Id. The intermediate court reasoned that without an express condition prece-
dent, the option could not be withheld because of rent arrearages. Id.
47. Utter, J., with Brachtenbach, C.J., Stafford, Dolliver, Hicks, and Dimmick, J.J.,
concurring, and Rosellini, J., dissenting, with Williams and Dore, J.J., concurring in the
dissent.
48. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 813-14, 631 P.2d at 925 ("the lessee's pattern of
conduct indicated, at the time of the attempted renewal, that it was in effect not agree-
ing to the terms of the option") (emphasis in the original).
49. Id. at 815, 631 P.2d at 926. "[Playment of rent is an implied condition which
must be satisfied." Id. at 814, 631 P.2d at 926 (quoting Nork v. Pacific Coast Medical
Enters., Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 410, 416, 140 Cal. Rptr. 734, 737 (1977)). See also Klepper
v. Hoover, 21 Cal. App. 3d 460, 464, 98 Cal. Rptr. 482, 484 (1971) (rent is a condition
upon which the option must be exercised).
50. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 814-15, 631 P.2d at 926 (citing Gadsden Bowling
Center, Inc. v. Frank, 249 Ala. 435, 31 So. 2d 648 (1947), in which the landlord did not
have to renew tenant's lease when tenant was in serious rent arrears and had violated
some express covenants regarding bowling alley fixtures).
51. Stoebuck, Part I, supra note 1, at 306-07. See also supra notes 1-2.
52. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 814, 631 P.2d at 926. "The California rule, which
we now adopt, is consistent with the evolving trend of applying contract, rather than
conveyancing, rules to leases." Id. at 814 n.2, 631 P.2d at 926 n.2.
53. See infra text section IV.
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IV. FACTORS INFLUENCING DEPENDENT COVENANT REASONING IN
Hindquarter
Courts have little trouble enforcing commercial lease provi-
sions when the language expressly sets out the parties' responsi-
bilities. 4 When the lease is silent or ambiguous on certain mat-
ters, however, the courts must look elsewhere to determine the
parties' intent and the equities of the case.55 Hindquarter exem-
plifies the modern movement that looks beyond the lease to
resolve rental disputes. The Hindquarter court looked beyond
the terms of the lease because the controversy focused on an
unclear option to renew. Renewal options are often difficult to
interpret because parties frequently fail to specify the conditions
under which the tenant may renew the lease.5" If the option is
expressly tied to the tenant's performance of certain covenants,
a breach will almost certainly foreclose the option. 7 If the
option or other lease provision is couched in vague terms,58 how-
54. See, e.g., Wilsonian Inv. Co. v. Swope, 180 Wash. 35, 38 P.2d 399 (1934) (lease
specifically provided that refrigeration plant was the responsibility of the landlord).
55. E.g., Toellner v. McGinnis, 55 Wash. 430, 104 P. 641 (1909) (court looked to the
parties' intent when they agreed on the lease to determine whether the landlord would
buy the lessee's building at the close of the lease, and under what conditions). Courts in
the following states have implied dependent covenants in options to renew: Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Louisiana, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. See
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Gowan, 240 Ala. 497, 199 So. 849 (1941); Jones v. Epstein, 134
Ark. 505, 204 S.W. 217 (1918); Felder v. Hall Bros., 151 Ark. 182, 235 S.W. 789 (1921);
Lutterloh v. Patterson, 211 Ark. 814, 202 S.W.2d 767 (1947); Nork v. Pacific Coast Medi-
cal Enters., Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 410, 140 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1977); Klepper v. Hoover, 21
Cal. App. 3d 460, 98 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1971); Brown v. Hoffman, 628 P.2d 617 (Colo. 1981);
Piper v. Levy, 114 La. 544, 38 So. 448 (1905); Skillman v. Lynch, 74 S.D. 212, 50 N.W.2d
641 (1951); Hillhaven, Inc. v. Care One, Inc., 620 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981);
Hindquarter Corp. v. Property Dev. Corp., 95 Wash. 2d 809, 631 P.2d 923 (1981).
56. See, e.g., Brown v. Hoffman, 628 P.2d 617, 622 (Colo. 1981) (no lease language
governed conditions under which tenant could renew the lease; court held that rent and
renewal were dependent).
57. See, e.g., Jones v. Epstein, 134 Ark. 505, 511, 204 S.W. 217, 218 (1918) (court
refused tenant's appeal to renew lease because tenant expressly covenanted to build and
maintain a hoop milling plant and renewal was based on the original lease terms);
Behrman v. Barto, 54 Cal. 131, 134 (1880) (tenant paid last rent installment late and
thus forfeited right to renew because the renewal was based on timely performance of
express covenants); Henry v. Bruhn & Henry, Inc., 114 Wash. 180, 184-85, 195 P. 20, 22
(1921) (tenant violated specific covenants in farm lease, but court allowed tenant to
renew lease because landlord knew about and acquiesced in the tenant's course of deal-
ing for the five-year lease period).
58. Murray v. Odman, 1 Wash. 2d 481, 488-89, 96 P.2d 489, 492 (1939) (court con-
strued ambiguity in lease language against landlord who drafted lease as to whether the
rent was ground rent only or included improvements as well).
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ever, or if there is no limiting language at all,59 the courts must
decide what rules will guide them as they interpret the cove-
nants. Three factors common to contract rather than to convey-
ancing law have helped courts in general, and the Hindquarter
court in particular, interpret ambiguity or silence in leases: (1)
the parties' material inducements6" to execute the lease; (2) the
parties' intent, gathered from the lease language and other cir-
cumstances; and (3) equitable considerations."e
A. Material Inducements in Commercial Leases
Tenants and landlords enter into lease agreements because
they hope to gain from the lease. One commentator has sug-
gested that because commercial leases involve more bargaining
than do residential leases, express covenants in commercial
leases are more likely to reflect the parties' purposes in execut-
ing the lease and thus should be mutually dependent.6 2 The
rationale is that the tenant or landlord would have contracted
only if the inducement were present.6 3
59. E.g., Darling Shop of Birmingham, Inc. v. Nelson Realty Co., 255 Ala. 586, 591,
52 So. 2d 211, 215 (1951) (covenant to renew not expressly tied to timely rent payment
and other covenants, so court held that the covenants were independent); Keene v.
Zindorf, 81 Wash. 152, 162-63, 142 P. 484, 488 (1914) (the covenants in the lease all
related to the original lease period, but were not directly connected with the option to
renew and purchase at the end of the lease; court held that failure to pay the final rent
installment when due, but before the original lease ended, was sufficient compliance to
preserve the tenant's right to renew); Draper Machine Works, Inc. v. Hagberg, 34 Wash.
App. 483, 486-87, 663 P.2d 141, 143-44 (1983) (tenant claimed landlord violated implied
covenant of quiet enjoyment by failing to turn over leased property at the beginning of
the lease period; court held for the landlord because the tenant did not vacate in timely
manner).
60. A material, or a significant, inducement is one of such importance that the ten-
ant or landlord would not have entered into the lease without its presence. "[Tjhose
covenants which run to the entire consideration of a contract are mutual and depen-
dent." Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 419, 132 P.2d 457,
462 (1942) (en banc). In Medico-Dental, the tenant drug store would not have entered
into the lease without the landlords' assurance that no other druggist would be allowed
to do business in the building. Thus, noncompetition was a material inducement, breach
of which allowed the tenant to rescind under the dependent covenant theory. Id. at 419-
20, 132 P.2d at 462-63. See infra notes 65-68.
61. See infra notes 62-137 and accompanying text.
62. Hicks, supra note 19, at 464 ("It is in this type of lease [commercial] that the
view of holding only those express covenants deemed to be vital enough to go to the
'whole consideration' of the lease to be mutually dependent has worked the most
satisfactorily.").
63. Ringwood Assocs., Ltd. v. Jack's of Route 23, Inc., 166 N.J. Super. 36, 45, 398
A.2d 1315, 1320 (1979) (tenant allowed to rescind lease when landlord refused to permit
assignment of lease because tenant would not have leased unless landlord had agreed to
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1. Tenant Inducements
A commercial tenant may receive the benefit of implied
dependent covenants when the landlord's promise is a signifi-
cant inducement to the tenant.6" One common type of material
inducement for the commercial tenant is the covenant not to
compete.6" In the typical situation, the landlord promises not to
lease nearby property to another business in the same specializa-
tion (a noncompetition clause). 66 When the landlord breaches a
noncompetition clause, the tenant usually stops paying rent or
vacates.67 In court, the tenant must show that the landlord's
breach concerned an inducement that was so important to the
tenant that the tenant would not have leased the property with-
out the inducement.68 In addition to noncompetition clauses,
other material inducements for the tenant that have been
upheld by courts include: (1) the availability of assignment of
the lease;6 9 (2) promised building repairs;70 and (3) sufficient
resources, such as power or heat, to run the business.71 In all
permit assignment); Pawco, Inc. v. Bergman Knitting Mills, Inc., 283 Pa. Super. 443, 454,
424 A.2d 891, 896-97 (1980) (court held for tenant when landlord cut energy supply to
run tenant's manufacturing business because tenant would not have leased the premises
without the energy supply).
64. Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C.L.
REV. 503, 558 (1982) ("a commercial tenant should have the benefit of the contract doc-
trine of mutuality of covenants, at least where the landlord's promise in issue was a
'significant inducement to the making of the lease' ").
65. A covenant not to compete is the promise to withhold competition, which is a
valuable consideration. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 86 (1963).
66. See, e.g., University Club v. Deakin, 265 Ill. 257, 260, 106 N.E. 790, 792 (1914)
(tenant allowed to rescind lease when landlord breached a noncompetition clause that
was a vital provision in the lease).
67. See, e.g., Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 417,
132 P.2d 457, 461-62 (1942) (en banc) (when landlord allowed a medical organization
lessee to dispense drugs, the pharmacist tenant was justified in withholding rent and
vacating because landlord had assured tenant that no other druggist would be allowed to
rent space in the medical center); Teodori v. Werner, 490 Pa. 58, 65, 415 A.2d 31, 34
(1980) (when landlord rented shopping center space to another jeweler, tenant was justi-
fied in withholding rent because the noncompetition clause was a material inducement).
68. Teodori v. Werner, 490 Pa. 58, 65, 415 A.2d 31, 34 (1980).
69. E.g., Ringwood Assocs., Ltd. v. Jack's of Route 23, Inc., 166 N.J. Super. 36, 45,
398 A.2d 1315, 1320 (1979) (tenant could break lease when landlord refused to allow a
reasonable assignment; the ability to assign was the tenant's material inducement).
70. E.g., Groh v. Kover's Bull Pen, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 2d 611, 614, 34 Cal. Rptr. 637,
639 (1963) (tenant successfully claimed constructive eviction because landlord's express
agreement to maintain the restaurant roof went to the "very root" of tenant's
consideration).
71. E.g., Pawco, Inc. v. Bergman Knitting Mills, 283 Pa. Super. 443, 447, 424 A.2d
891, 893 (1980) (lessor failed to provide sufficient oil to run steam plant, thus knitting
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instances, the tenants proved that they would not have rented
the premises without the inducement. The tenant's inducement
in Hindquarter was not prominently discussed; the landlord's
inducement, however, was a major factor.72
2. Landlord Inducements
A commercial landlord's purpose for entering into a lease is
invariably the rent.73 The quid pro quo of early leases was rent
in exchange for possession. 74 The tenant's duty to pay rent
stemmed from the idea that rent issued both from the property
itself (conveyance) and from the tenant's express covenant to
pay rent (contract).75 When the tenant does not pay the rent
and cannot successfully claim a defense such as waiver or sub-
stantial compliance,78 the courts generally have held that the
nonpayment of rent is a substantial breach that justifies holding
for the landlord. 7
Apart from rent, the most frequently encountered material
inducements for the landlord include: (1) part of the profits
from the tenant's business;78  (2) exclusive covenants by
manufacturer tenant had a defense in an ejectment and back rent action); Esmieu v.
Hsieh, 20 Wash. App. 455, 460, 580 P.2d 1105, 1108 (1978) (landlord's covenant to help
tenant secure irrigation rights for otherwise barren land held to be impliedly dependent
on tenant's duty to pay rent), aff'd, 92 Wash. 2d 530, 598 P.2d 1369 (1979).
72. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 815, 631 P.2d at 926 ("The primary consideration
for any lease is the rent to be paid and its nonpayment substantially undermines the
basis for the agreement.").
73. Humbach, The Common-Law Conception of Leasing: Mitigation, Habitability,
and Dependence of Covenants, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1213, 1273 (1983) ("The landlord's
interest in leasing transactions is almost always purely pecuniary. Landlords are in the
business of leasing for the rents that leases produce.").
74. See Love, supra note 15, at 32 (at least as early as the 16th century, rent was
"commonly regarded as the quid pro quo for possession"); McGovern, supra note 16, at
705 (citing a case decided in 1478 involving the rule that quid pro quo is essential for a
valid contract).
75. Glendon, supra note 64, at 511. But see Stoebuck, The Law Between Landlord
and Tenant in Washington: Part 11, 49 WASH. L. REV. 1013, 1016 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Stoebuck, Part II].
76. See infra notes 86-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of these defenses
in a lease context.
77. See, e.g., Nork v. Pacific Coast Medical Enters., Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 410, 416,
140 Cal. Rptr. 734, 737 (1977) ("payment of rent is an implied condition which must be
satisfied . . . before the option can be exercised"); Brown v. Hoffman, 628 P.2d 617, 621-
22 (Colo. 1981) (habitual failure to pay rent on time justified landlord's refusal to renew
the lease; renewal dependent on timely rent payments).
78. E.g., Cousins Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 141, 153, 113
P.2d 878, 884 (1941) (court held that the lease did not bind the tenant to stay in busi-
ness when the lease allowed the landlord to collect rent and a percentage of profits from
[Vol. 8:485
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franchises to purchase only distributor's products;7 9 and (3) roy-
alties, especially in leases of oil, gas, and mineral rights.80 The
trial court implied in Hindquarter that rent was the landlord's
inducement to lease space to Hindquarter." Property Develop-
ment "simply would not have entered into the original lease
agreement [if it had been] able to anticipate the indifferent per-
formance by The Hindquarter of its lease obligations. 8 2 The
Washington Supreme Court agreed that "[t]he primary consid-
eration for any lease is the rent to be paid and its nonpayment
substantially undermines the basis for the agreement.
' 3
Because Hindquarter had repeatedly breached the express cove-
nant to pay rent contained in section 7.1(a) of the lease, 4 the
landlord could infer that Hindquarter could not or would not
comply with the terms of the option, which were to be the same
as those in effect at the time the option was exercised.8
5
3. Defenses to Breach of a Material Inducement
Hindquarter had at least one defense to Property Develop-
ment's charge that frequent breach of the agreement to pay rent
defeated the restaurant's right to renew.86 Contract law provides
the breaching party with several defenses, 7 some of which have
the tenant's clothier company).
79. E.g., Bill Wolf Petroleum Corp. v. Chock Full of Power Gasoline Corp., 70 Misc.
2d 314, 318, 333 N.Y.S.2d 472, 478-79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972). In Bill Wolf, the oil distribu-
tor had an implied, rather than an express, provision in the lease that the service station
owner would buy all of his petroleum products from the distributor. The court held that,
since the covenant did not run with the land, the subsequent service station owner was
not bound by the promise. Id. at 319, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 478-79.
80. E.g., Ashland Oil and Refining Co. v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 462 F.2d 204 (10th
Cir. 1972) (natural gas); Taylor v. Kingman Feldspar Co., 41 Ariz. 376, 18 P.2d 649
(1933) (minerals-feldspar); Darr v. Eldridge, 66 N.M. 260, 346 P.2d 1041 (1959) (implied
covenant to market mineral water). See also Pressler, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas
Leases, 18 Miss. L.J. 402, 405 (1947) ("the main consideration to the lessor for his lease
is the royalty which he expects to receive from its development").
81. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 811, 631 P.2d at 924.
82. Brief of Respondent at 37, Hindquarter Corp. v. Property Dev. Corp., 95 Wash.
2d 809, 631 P.2d 923 (1981).
83. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 815, 631 P.2d at 926.
84. Id. at 813, 631 P.2d at 926.
85. Id. at 813-14, 631 P.2d at 925-26.
86. Id. at 811, 631 P.2d at 924.
87. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979). Several chapters are
devoted to breaches and defenses, including the following: Chapter 6-Mistake; Chapter
7-Misrepresentation; Chapter 8-Unenforceability on Grounds of Public Policy; Chap-
ter 10-Performance and Non-Performance; and Chapter 11-Impracticality of Perform-
ance and Frustration of Purpose.
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followed the contract doctrine of material inducement into the
field of leasing. These defenses include substantial compliance,8"
breach after the other party's first material breach, 89 and
waiver9" of certain contract duties.91
The most obvious defense to a claim of material breach is
that the breaching party in fact substantially complied with its
promises: that the breach was minor and did not thwart the
other's material inducement.2 For instance, a tenant who is one
or two months behind in rent at the end of a long lease with no
other history of breach may have substantially complied with
the lease, and should not be prevented from renewing the
lease.9 3
Another defense is that the other party breached the lease
first.9 4 Typically, this charge arises in the form of a counterclaim
that the plaintiff committed the first serious breach, thus justi-
fying the defendant's subsequent breach. The court must then
determine which party committed the first breach that was seri-
ous enough to effect a material inducement. Once the court
determines who made the first material breach, the other party
generally prevails.9 5
A third defense to a charge of breaching a material induce-
ment is waiver of the covenant. Either the landlord or the tenant
may waive the right to object to the other's breach. The waiving
88. E.g., Keene v. Zindorf, 81 Wash. 152, 162-63, 142 P. 484, 488 (1914) (payment
before the end of the lease was sufficient compliance to preserve the option to renew,
even though the lease stated that payment was due earlier).
89. E.g., Esmieu v. Hsieh, 20 Wash. App. 455, 460, 580 P.2d 1105, 1109 (1978)
(breach of landlord's covenant to provide irrigation water to dry land excused the ten-
ant's duty to pay rent), aff'd, 92 Wash. 2d 530, 598 P.2d 1369 (1979).
90. A waiver is the "relinquishment, intentionally, of a known right by the possessor
of that right." Lee v. Casualty Co. of Am., 90 Conn. 202, 209, 96 A. 952, 955 (1916).
91. E.g., Henry v. Bruhn & Henry, Inc., 114 Wash. 180, 185, 195 P. 20, 22 (1921)
(landlord acquiesced for entire five-year lease in tenant's late payments).
92. See, e.g., Kaliterna v. Wright, 94 Cal. App. 2d 926, 936, 212 P.2d 32, 37-38 (1949)
(landlord waived tenant's minor breaches of the covenants and so could not later refuse
to renew on their account), overruled on other grounds, State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 428, 304 P.2d 13 (1956). See also Greenfield & Margolies, An
Implied Warranty of Fitness in Nonresidential Leases, 45 ALB. L. REV. 855, 876 (1981)
("dependence of covenants in leases should be tempered by the doctrine of substantial
compliance"; thus, a minor breach at the end of a long lease should not work a
forfeiture).
93. E.g., Keene v. Zindorf, 81 Wash. 152, 161, 142 P. 484, 486 (1914).
94. E.g., Esmieu v. Hseih, 20 Wash. App. 455, 460, 580 P.2d 1105, 1109 (1978) (land-
lord breached first by not ensuring that the dry farmland had access to irrigation; ten-
ant's subsequent breach was justified), aff'd, 92 Wash. 2d 530, 598 P.2d 1369 (1979).
95. Id.
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party may not object later to the same breach.90 A landlord who
accepts late payments on a regular basis may not, months later,
suddenly object to late rent; the court will often hold that the
landlord has waived the right to object.9 7 Some typical instances
in which waiver has been found include regular acceptance of
late rent,98 failure to enforce a forfeiture when it occurred, 99 and
failure to object within a reasonable time to some activity specif-
ically restricted by the lease.100
The tenant in Hindquarter tried unsuccessfully to defend
itself against the charge of breaching a material inducement.
The restaurant argued that Property Development had waived
timely rent payments. The trial court did not find a waiver, and
a majority of the supreme court accepted that finding.'0 1
Although Hindquarter argued that Property Development had
accepted late payments before, therefore consenting to tardy
rents, the court found that Property Development had not suf-
fered Hindquarter's delays willingly or passively. In fact, twice
before the landlord had sent Hindquarter ten-day .notices to pay
rent or to vacate, and had initiated summary judgment suits to
collect rent. 02 The supreme court said that these facts set the
case apart from other Washington cases, such as Henry v. Bruhn
96. E.g., Draper Machine Works, Inc. v. Hagberg, 34 Wash. App. 483, 486-87, 663
P.2d 141, 143 (1983) (tenant waived right to declare constructive eviction because he
waited three months to claim it).
97. E.g., Henry v. Bruhn & Henry, Inc., 114 Wash. 180, 185, 195 P. 20, 22 (1921)
(tenant was allowed to renew lease even though he had violated specific covenants
because the landlord acquiesced in the tenant's habitual delay in paying rent).
98. E.g., Lenci v. Owner, 30 Wash. App. 800, 803, 638 P.2d 598, 600 (1981) (court
said that a landlord's acceptance of late rent did not waive his express right to refuse
tenant's subsequent request to renew the lease); Kaufman Bros. Constr., Inc. v. Estate of
Olney, 29 Wash. App. 296, 300, 628 P.2d 838, 841 (1981) (although failure to pay rent
may have given the landlord the opportunity to terminate the lease, he first had to
declare his intent to do so; otherwise, the breach may be considered waived).
99. E.g., Swift v. Occidental Mining & Petroleum Co., 141 Cal. 161, 173, 74 P. 700,
704 (1903) (landlord failed to object to tenant's work stoppage in notation of tenant's
promise to drill diligently for oil during the entirety of the lease).
100. E.g., Saxeny v. Panis, 239 Mass. 207, 210, 131 N.E. 331, 333 (1921) (acceptance
of late rent, if accepted with knowledge, waives breach). But see Skillman v. Lynch, 74
S.D. 212, 217, 50 N.W.2d 641, 643 (1951) (waiver not declared when landlord overlooked
gambling activities for a while, then enforced lease restriction when the neighbors com-
plained following a police raid).
101. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 812, 631 P.2d at 925. Section 10.3 of the lease
stated that no consent or waiver by landlord to any tenant breach waived any other
tenant duty.
102. Brief of Respondent at 45, Hindquarter Corp. v. Property Dev. Corp., 95 Wash.
2d 809, 631 P.2d 923 (1981).
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& Henry, Inc.,'0 3 in which acceptance of late rent effected a
waiver. The intent to waive was proved in Henry because the
landlord never filed suit to collect rent, as did the landlord in
Hindquarter.10 4
The presence of material inducements will influence the
court as it decides whether a lease contained dependent cove-
nants. Rent was found to be Property Development's material
inducement, and that fact helped lead to the court's finding of
dependent covenants. Although defenses such as waiver or
immateriality of breach may excuse the breach, such defenses
failed in Hindquarter, and the dependent covenant theory pre-
vailed. Another factor that courts must consider as they seek to
determine whether dependent covenants exist is the parties'
intent-what each meant the lease to convey.
B. Determining Parties' Intent in Order to Find Dependent
Covenants
In addition to material inducements, the Hindquarter court
examined the parties' intent to determine whether the lease con-
tained dependent covenants. When the lease language is unclear
on a disputed issue, courts must look elsewhere to decide
whether the parties intended their covenants to be dependent.'05
The Hindquarter court relied on the reasoning of an earlier
Washington court in Toeliner v. McGinnis10 6 to find evidence of
intent. 0 7 In Toeliner, the tenants demanded payment for a
building that they erected on the landlord's property, payment
that the landlord expressly agreed to make at the end of the
lease term. The tenants had agreed to pay certain rents, but
because they did not pay any rent for a significant part of the
103. 114 Wash. 180, 195 P. 20 (1921). The tenant's default in Henry was cured
before the landlord filed suit. Id. at 185, 195 P. at 22. Hindquarter was still two months
in arrears at the time of trial. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 812, 631 P.2d at 925.
104. 95 Wash. 2d at 815, 631 P.2d at 926.
105. See, e.g., Murray v. Odman, 1 Wash. 2d 481, 486, 96 P.2d 489, 492 (1939)
(because both parties' interpretations were equally valid, the court adopted the interpre-
tation of the lessee, who did not draft the lease); Oregon-Wash. R.R. & Navigation Co. v.
Eastern Or. Banking Co., 81 Wash. 617, 622, 143 P. 154, 156 (1914) (using the Toellner
rule of considering the whole contract, the court looked at the "four corners" of the lease
to determine the parties' intent); Esmieu v. Hsieh, 20 Wash. App. 455, 460, 580 P.2d
1105, 1108 (1978) (the tenant had an overall written plan that included the disputed
land, all of which was worthless without the promised irrigation), aff'd, 92 Wash. 2d 530,
598 P.2d 1369 (1979).
106. 55 Wash. 430, 104 P. 641 (1909).
107. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 812-13, 631 P.2d at 925.
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ten-year lease, the landlord refused to pay for the building as
promised. 08 The trial court and the supreme court agreed that
each party intended to reap benefits that depended on the
other's performance. 109 The court's reasoning was based on the
"intention of the parties and the good sense of the case, and
technical words must give way to such intention.""'
The parties' intent and the "good sense of the case" are
determined by examining the existing contract language and the
surrounding circumstances."' Often, the party who wants the
covenants to be dependent will point to express lease language
and argue that the express promises imply other, unstated
promises that must also be dependent." 2 The difficulty lies in
convincing the court that there is a requisite connection between
the express and implied covenants that would necessarily lead to
a holding that the latter covenants are also dependent. For
instance, the common renewal phrase "under the same terms
and conditions as those in the original lease" has led some courts
to hold that nonpayment of rent will cancel the promise to allow
a renewal." 3 This is so because the landlord has proved that the
108. Toellner, 55 Wash. at 431, 104 P. at 642.
109. Id. at 437-38, 104 P. at 644 ("The one promise would not have been made
unless the other had been undertaken. They were mutual and dependent.").
110. Id. at 437, 104 P. at 644 (quoting L. JONES, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 324
(1906)).
111. Esmieu v. Hsieh, 20 Wash. App. 455, 460, 580 P.2d 1105, 1108 (1978), aff'd, 92
Wash. 2d 530, 598 P.2d 1369 (1979). Although the lease did not specifically create depen-
dent covenants, the court held that the covenant to pay rent depended on the landlord's
cooperation in securing irrigation. The court applied the Toellner rule and looked at the
whole agreement. It was evident from the tenant's plans and his actions that he
depended on the landlord's promise. Id.
112. E.g., Gadsden Bowling Center, Inc. v. Frank, 249 Ala. 435, 439, 31 So. 2d 648,
651 (1947) (court implied that renewal was conditioned upon express tenant covenant
allowing the landlord to terminate the lease for tenant's nonperformance); Nork v.
Pacific Coast Medical Enters., Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 410, 416, 140 Cal. Rptr. 734, 737
(1977) ("payment of rent is an implied condition which must be satisfied in addition to
other express covenants in the lease before the option can be exercised").
113. E.g., Brown v. Hoffman, 628 P.2d 617, 621-22 (Colo. 1981) ("A lease ... is to
be reasonably interpreted according to the apparent intention of the parties."). The
Brown court looked at all of the parties' writings and concluded that together they were
sufficient to show the landlord's intent to renew only if the tenant had faithfully paid his
rent. Id. Contra Darling Shop of Birmingham, Inc. v. Nelson Realty Co., 255 Ala. 586,
591, 52 So. 2d 211, 215 (1951). In Darling Shop, the landlord could not produce enough
evidence to persuade the Alabama high court to tie dependent express covenants to an
option to renew that was not made expressly dependent on any tenant promise. The
landlord claimed that the tenant was late with rent and did not keep its books in order,
but the court was not persuaded to go against the general conveyancing rule that cove-
nants are independent in a commercial lease unless expressly made dependent. Id.
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parties' intent and the common sense of the case lead to a
dependent, if implied, connection between timely rent payment
and the option to renew the lease. Obviously, the landlord will
have an easier time making such an argument if the tenant's
actions are fairly egregious." 4 These two pieces of evidence-the
express lease language and the parties' actions-worked to the
landlord's advantage in Hindquarter.
The Hindquarter court applied the Toeliner rule of the par-
ties' intent and the "good sense of the case"' 15 and found that
there was indeed a dependent covenant that tied timely pay-
ment of rent to lease renewal."1 The court examined several of
the lease provisions to reach this conclusion. The terms of the
lease during option periods were to be the same as those in
effect during the lease.' 1 7 The lease stated that the tenant "upon
paying the rent" was to have "quiet enjoyment" throughout the
lease term or until the lease was terminated. 1 8 Finally, a third
provision stated that rent would be promptly paid."19 The Wash-
ington Supreme Court concluded that these lease sections
showed the landlord's intent to make renewal conditional upon
timely rent payment, even though there was no express language
tying rent to the option to renew. 120
The Hindquarter court also examined the tenant's actions
to determine intent.' 2 ' Section 7.1(a) of the lease bound Hind-
114. Gadsden Bowling Center, Inc. v. Frank, 249 Ala. 435, 438, 31 So. 2d 648, 649-50
(1947) (tenant was so often in arrears "as to indicate a general course of conduct");
Brown v. Hoffman, 628 P.2d 617, 622 (Colo. 1981) ("lessee's failure to pay the required
rent was intentional and willful, and was a substantial breach of the lease, which pre-
cluded the lessee's exercise of the option to renew").
115. Toellner, 55 Wash. at 437, 104 P. at 644.
116. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 813, 631 P.2d at 925 ("Applying those [Toeliner]
principles to this case, we conclude, after reviewing the entire lease and resorting to com-
mon sense, that Hindquarter's chronic failure to pay rent made its option
unenforceable.").
117. Id., Lease § 2.2 ("The terms and conditions of this lease during said option
periods shall be the same as those in effect at the time of the exercise of said options.").
118. Id. at 814, 631 P.2d at 926, Lease § 9.3 ("Landlord covenants that Tenant, on
paying the rent ... shall peacefully and quietly have, hold, and enjoy the leased
premises.").
119. Id. at 813 n.1, 631 P.2d at 925-26 n.1, Lease § 7.1(a) (the tenant covenanted to
"perform promptly all of the obligations of Tenant set forth in this Lease ... and to pay
when due the Minimum Fixed Rent and the Percentage Rent and all other charges, rates
and other sums which by the terms of this Lease are to be paid by Tenant").
120. Id. at 814, 631 P.2d at 926 (the court goes on to refer to § 9.3 of the lease as yet
more evidence showing the parties intended renewal to be dependent upon timely rent
payments). See supra note 118.
121. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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quarter to pay rent when due. Yet Hindquarter's pattern of con-
duct demonstrated that it either could not or would not comply
with the rental conditions.122 The court concluded that Hind-
quarter was "in effect not agreeing to the terms of the
option.' 123
The express language of the rental contract implied that the
parties intended rent payment to be a factor in any option to
renew,124 and Hindquarter's actions indicated an intent not to
abide by the express or implied covenants that tied rent pay-
ment to renewal. 25 The court also held that rent was expressly
and impliedly a condition for renewal because rent is the land-
lord's main inducement to enter into a lease arrangement.
2
1
Therefore, the court concluded that there was sufficient justifi-
cation to deny the tenant's claim of right to renewal. In addition
to material inducement and the parties' intent, the court offered
one more factor to illustrate why Hindquarter should not pre-
vail: fundamental fairness. The court reasoned that it would
have been "fundamentally unfair to require a landlord to renew
a lease when rental payments are uncertain.' ' 27 Fairness encom-
passes equitable and policy considerations that formed the third
factor employed by the Hindquarter court to reach its decision.
C. Equitable and Policy Considerations That Have Led to
Dependent Covenant Decisions
Fundamental fairness is a rationale that judges use to jus-
tify holdings that are not decided on strictly legal grounds. Fair-
ness may be tied to a specific remedy in equity, such as rescis-
sion for fraud, 28 or fairness may involve what the Toellner court
122. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 813-14, 631 P.2d at 925-26.
123. Id. (emphasis in the original) (citing Gadsden Bowling Center, Inc. v. Frank,
249 Ala. 435, 31 So. 2d 648 (1947)).
124. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
125. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 813-14, 631 P.2d at 926.
126. Id. at 815, 631 P.2d at 926 ("The primary consideration for any lease is the rent
to be paid and its nonpayment substantially undermines the basis for the agreement.").
See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
127. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 814-15, 631 P.2d at 926.
128. E.g., Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Gowan, 240 Ala. 497, 499, 199 So. 849, 850 (1941)
(gas station tenants asked the court to order the landlord to renew the lease, but the
tenant had defrauded the landlord on the gallonage sold per month, which relieved the
landlord of his promise to renew the lease). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 364 comment a, at 185 (1981), which provides that "the discretionary nature of
equitable relief permits its denial when a variety of factors combine to make enforce-
ment of a promise unfair." These general equitable doctrines include "unclean hands."
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called "the good sense of the case" 2e9-the public policies that
influence case law just as they influence statutes. The final
explanation offered by the Hindquarter court for its holding was
that it would have been "fundamentally unfair" to force Prop-
erty Development to renew Hindquarter's lease when the tenant
had been so desultory about fulfilling its own lease obliga-
tions. 30 The court added that the use of contract rather than
conveyancing law produced "fairer" results.1 31 Public policy is
served by holding parties to their contracts and to their
expectations.
The dissent in Hindquarter argued that fairness should
favor the tenant.1 32 Any doubt about the parties' intent and the
lease language should be resolved in favor of the tenant because
the landlord drafted the lease and because ambiguities are tradi-
tionally resolved in favor of the party who did not draft the con-
tract. 1 33 The argument is solid, for the general rule in Washing-
ton has been to favor tenants over landlords in both case law
and statute, at least in residential contexts.3 The contract prin-
ciples espoused by the Washington Supreme Court in Hindquar-
ter will most certainly benefit more tenants than landlords, for
much the same reasons that residential tenants have benefited
from dependent covenant theories."' A primary reason why the
majority in Hindquarter let the equities and policy concerns fall
for the landlord-despite decisional precedent and despite
implications for the future-was that Hindquarter's past acts
had been so egregious as to amount to a violation of the equita-
ble "unclean hands"' 3 6 doctrine.
Id. See infra note 136.
129. Toellner v. McGinnis, 55 Wash. 430, 437, 104 P. 641, 644 (1909). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 comment c, at 165 (1981) ("In granting
relief, as well as in denying it, a court [of equity] may take into consideration the public
interest.").
130. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 814-15, 631 P.2d at 926.
131. Id. at 814 n.2, 631 P.2d at 926 n.2.
132. Id. at 815, 631 P.2d at 927 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 816, 631 P.2d at 927.
134. Stoebuck, Part II, supra note 75, at 1090. Washington courts have increasingly
favored tenants in lease disputes. "The doctrine that leases shall be construed against
the drafter, who has been the landlord in the cases, has been applied with vigor." Id. See
also Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973), and WASH. REV. CODE ch.
59.18 (1984), both of which illustrate Washington's public policy favoring tenants over
landlords.
135. See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text.
136. "[Wlhen the tenant comes into equity, he must do so with clean hands." Gads-
den Bowling Center, Inc. v. Frank, 249 Ala. 435, 439, 31 So. 2d 648, 651 (1947) (tenant
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The clean hands rule is useful in determining whether cove-
nants should be dependent. In Hindquarter, for instance, the
legal issue was whether the option to renew could be made
dependent upon timely performance of seemingly unrelated
express covenants concerning rent.1 7 The equitable issue was
whether the landlord should have to renew an unreliable tenant.
The inequitable nature of Hindquarter's continual failure to pay
rent reinforced the two ,legal bases that the landlord postulated
(material inducement and the parties' intent). The tenant's
chronic noncompliance decreased its equitable edge while at the
same time emphasizing the unjustness of requiring the landlord
to renew a tenant with Hindquarter's history of late rent and
checks drawn on insufficient funds. The landlord's previous legal
actions to collect rent also decreased Hindquarter's "edge." In
the future, tenants whose behavior approaches that of Hind-
quarter will lose the equitable and public policy bias that tradi-
tionally favors tenants in this state.
Relative bargaining power is another policy rationale that
deserves mention, although it was not a factor in the Hindquar-
ter decision. As described earlier,13 commercial tenants gener-
ally have not persuaded courts to analogize their situations to
those of residential tenants claiming warranty of habitability or
covenant of quiet enjoyment.3 9 The reason courts often give for
dismissing such claims by commercial tenants is that commer-
wanted the court to force the landlord to renew the lease, but the tenant was so often
behind in rent that the court denied him an equitable ruling). The "unclean hands"
doctrine means that any party who seeks equitable relief must not have behaved inequi-
tably himself. See, e.g., Hdagen Dazs, Inc. v. Frusen Glidj6, Ltd., 493 F. Supp. 73
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (an American ice cream manufacturer who traded on a false Scandina-
vian affiliation accused another of trading on a spurious connection with a Swedish ice
cream enterprise; plaintiff did not enter equity with clean hands, so the court denied
equitable relief). Although the Hindquarter court did not use the term "unclean hands,"
it cited a case that did-Gadsden Bowling Center, Inc. v. Frank, 249 Ala. 435, 439, 31 So.
2d 648, 651 (1947). The tenant's chronic failure to pay rent on time coupled with express
violations of lease covenants precluded him from claiming equitable relief because his
own acts were inequitable, i.e., he had unclean hands. Id.
137. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 810, 631 P.2d at 924.
138. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
139. E.g., Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3d 552, 560-61, 166 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624-25
(1980). In Schulman, the commercial tenant tried to use the reasoning that a residential
tenant had used successfully six years before in Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616,
517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974), a case involving implied warranty of habitabil-
ity. The Schulman court refused to accept the analogy because the tenant was a busi-
nessman who was expected to bargain at arm's length. Schulman, 108 Cal. App. at 560-
61, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25.
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cial tenants have the business acumen and economic leverage to
bargain for leases that protect their interests.14 In the few com-
mercial lease actions in which courts have allowed the claim of
inequality of bargaining position, the tenants have prevailed
after proving that their relative power was as insignificant as
that of the average residential tenant.141 Thus, some commercial
tenants without control over needed repairs to common areas or
building climate control have prevailed on the same grounds as
their residential counterparts.142 Relative bargaining power may
yet become a serious claim for the commercial tenant, but the
burden of proof requires a substantial showing that the tenant
and landlord did not bargain as equals.
143
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Stoebuck noted in his exhaustive 1974 survey that
Washington courts have been "increasingly applying contract
reasoning to leases, a phenomenon that might allow the depen-
dency-independency issue to be re-examined one of these
days.114 4 That issue was indeed examined seven years later in
Hindquarter Corp. v. Property Development Corp.1 45 Hindquar-
ter clarified the Washington Supreme Court's position regarding
the use of the contract theory of mutually dependent covenants
in commercial property leases. When the covenants of either
party are material inducements to the lease,' then absent
140. E.g., Yuan Kane Ing v. Levy, 26 Ill. App. 3d 889, 892, 326 N.E.2d 51, 54 (1975)
(tenant real estate broker more knowledgeable about leases than his landlady, whose
command of the English language was limited).
141. E.g., Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 452, 251 A.2d 268, 273 (1969)
(commercial tenant had no way of knowing about a flooding problem before she moved
in and could not fix the problem, which originated in a common area of the building);
Demirci v. Burns, 124 N.J. Super. 274, 276, 306 A.2d 468, 469 (1973) (commercial tenants
who rented small office spaces in a large office complex could assert the equitable defense
that the landlord failed to provide heat or air conditioning).
142. Demirci v. Burns, 124 N.J. Super. 274, 276, 306 A.2d 468, 469 (1973). The
plight of the small tenant in a large shopping center or mall furnishes another example
of unequal bargaining power. Small tenants in shopping centers are bound by restrictive
covenants that overwhelmingly favor the landlord, and the tenants have little room to
bargain for individualized considerations or protections. See Pollack, Shopping Center
Leases, 9 U. KAN. L. REV. 379 (1961); Skolnik, Shopping Center Lease Negotiations:
Some Problems of Representing Small Tenants, 49 N.Y. ST. B.J. 28 (1977).
143. See supra note 141.
144. Stoebuck, Part II, supra note 75, at 1040.
145. 95 Wash. 2d 809, 631 P.2d 923 (1981).
146. See supra notes 60-80 and accompanying text.
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defenses such as waiver,"4 7 each party will be held to its
promises. When the court can find that one party intended to
reap benefits that depended on the performance of the other
party, it will hold that the covenants are mutually dependent,
even when express contract language is lacking.
148
Equitable as well as legal considerations favor dependent
over independent covenants. This is certainly true in residential
disputes, 49 and it is becoming more likely in commercial con-
texts. 50 In Washington, 'equity and public policy have tradition-
ally favored tenants.' 5' If the tenant has chronically breached
the lease, however, as did Hindquarter, then the courts may hold
that it would be "fundamentally unfair' 52 to hold even a com-
mercial landlord to the covenants of the lease.
Hindquarter demonstrates that the Washington courts are
willing to apply the relatively new doctrine of dependent cove-
nants to a commercial lease dispute, even to the extent that they
will imply a covenant from the limited lease language and the
intent of the parties. The Hindquarter decision does not mean
that Washington courts will apply their own individual prefer-
ences for contract or conveyancing law to resolve commercial
disputes. Rather, Washington has taken a step to the forefront
of a new movement in lease law, one that recognizes that con-
tract rules produce "fairer" results more in keeping with mod-
ern-day leasing realities. 53
In the future, commercial tenants will benefit most from the
Hindquarter decision, even though the landlord prevailed in
that instance. Hindquarter will give commercial tenants the con-
tract-law basis that they need to assert residential tenant claims,
such as implied warranty of fitness and covenant of quiet enjoy-
ment.154 The Washington Supreme Court already held in Foisy
147. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 105-25 and accompanying text.
149. E.g., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 627, 517 P.2d 1168, 1175, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 711 (1974) ("public policy compels landlords to bear the primary responsibil-
ity for . . . habitable housing"); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 595-96, 111 N.W.2d
409, 412 (1961) ("The legislature has made a policy judgment-that it is socially (and
politically) desirable to impose these duties on a property owner.").
150. E.g., Gadsden Bowling Center, Inc. v. Frank, 249 Ala. 435, 439, 31 So. 2d 648,
651 (1947) (tenant's violation of lease provision took away his equitable claim for specific
performance of a renewal option).
151. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
152. Hindquarter, 95 Wash. 2d at 814-15, 631 P.2d at 926.
153. Id. at 814-15, 631 P.2d at 926.
154. See supra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
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v. Wyman 5 5 that residential tenants deserve the protections
offered by contract law. The legislature also acted to protect
those who rent their homes by enacting the Residential Land-
lord-Tenant Act.1 56 Hindquarter was the next logical step
toward acknowledging that a modern commercial lease is far
more a contract for space than a conveyance of property.
Tracy R. Antley Faust
155. 83 Wash. 2d 22, 28, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (1973) (conveyancing law was suitable for
an agrarian society, but contract law better serves "modern day realities").
156. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 59.18 (1983). The Act spells out significant rights and
remedies of landlords and tenants.
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